Tag: Philosophy of Mind

This post marks the eighth and final installment in my series on four prominent theories concerning the nature of the mind. Note, of course, that I will be covering the nature of the mind in even greater depth in future posts on this blog. This series, however, has finally come to an end. In this final post, then, I will give a final assessment of plausibility of the four theories. For requisite context, it would be best to check out Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5, and 6, and 7. Let’s get into it! Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 8): Final Assessment”

This post marks the seventh installment in my series on the nature of the mind. In this post, we will critically evaluate Churchland’s eliminative materialism. For requisite context, it would be best to check out Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5, and 6. Let’s get this bread!

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 7): Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism”

This post marks the sixth installment in my series on the nature of the mind. In this post, we will critically evaluate Ryle’s theory of logical behaviorism. For requisite context, it would be best to check out Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5. Let’s dig in!

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 6): Ryle and Behaviorism”

This post marks the fifth installment in my series on the nature of the mind. In this post, we will critically evaluate Armstrong’s identity theory. For requisite context, it would be best to check out Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Let’s dig in!

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 5): Armstrong’s Identity Theory”

Rene Descartes provided a number of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. For that requisite context, check out Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. Today we shall briefly evaluate the principal objection to Cartesianism: the interaction problem. Without further ado, let’s evaluate Descartes’ arguments from dubitability and divisibility.

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 4): The Interaction Problem”

Rene Descartes provided a number of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. For that requisite context, check out Part 1 and Part 2 in this series. Without further ado, let’s evaluate Descartes’ arguments from dubitability and divisibility.

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 3): Descartes on Dubitability and Divisibility”

Rene Descartes provided a number of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. For that requisite context, check out Part 1 in this series. Without further ado, let’s evaluate Descartes’ conceivability argument.

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 2): An Appraisal of Descartes’ Conceivability Argument”

Can you make consciousness out of sand? You can squeeze it, punch it, toss it in the air, or do all sorts of things to it. But is any of that sufficient for conscious experience?

This post marks the first installment of my series on philosophical theories concerning the nature of the mind. Is mere sand (or other configurations of particles) sufficient for conscious experience? What is the relation between particles and people?

It is to these questions that we turn in this series. So sit back, relax, and put your thinking cap on!

Read more “Theories of Mind (Part 1): Cartesian Dualism”

Before delving into the following argument, it will be helpful to clarify the relevant notion of probability at play. First, probabilities are understood as reasonable degrees of expectation (i.e. epistemic probability). In a probability analysis which employs epistemic probabilities, we are concerned not so much with the way the world actually is apart from our justified acceptances, i.e. how likely things are by their nature; rather, we are concerned with the degree to which we expect an outcome given our justified acceptances. Read more “The Virtual Certainty of the Existence of Other Minds”